A Resurgent Chinese Identity: Analysing the Shift in China's Foreign Policy Since 2004 by Bose, Aftab
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Resurgent Chinese Identity: 
Analysing the Shift in China’s Foreign Policy Since 2004 
 
 
 
MA Thesis by Aftab Bose 
S1894986 
MA International Relations 
Specialisation: International Studies 
Email: bose.aftab@gmail.com 
7th July 2017 
Leiden University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aftab	  Bose	  S1894986	  	   2	  
Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Context and Background 
1.2 Research Puzzle 
2. Theory and Methodology 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
2.2 Methodology 
3. Literature Review 
3.1 Normative Structures 
3.1.1 The Ideological Dimension of Hegemonic Power 
3.1.2 The US As a Hegemon 
3.2 The Rise of China  
3.2.1 Historical Background 
3.2.2 The Realist Explanation 
3.2.3 The Liberalist Explanation 
3.2.4 The Constructivist Explanation  
4. Analysis and Argumentation 
4.1 The Chinese Identity 
4.1.1 Unity and Cultural Supremacy 
4.1.2 The Hierarchy of Tianxia 
4.1.3 Confucianism and the Absence of Self-Interest 
4.2 Manifestations of Chinese Identity in IR 
4.2.1 The Political System 
4.2.2 Territorial Integrity 
4.2.3 Non-Interference 
4.3 The Peaceful Rise 
4.4 Identity Projection 
4.5 From the Other Perspective 
4.5.1 Economic Liberalisation 
4.5.2 Democracy 
5. Conclusion 
6. Bibliography 
 
Aftab	  Bose	  S1894986	  	   3	  
A Resurgent Chinese Identity 
 
Abstract: In 2004, China’s foreign policy appeared to enter a relatively expansive 
phase. The Chinese President, Hu Jintao, began to confidently make proclamations for 
a new world order, China's bilateral aid activities increased exponentially and China 
began to assert itself in international organisations. The change in China’s foreign 
policy would appear intuitively consistent with the activities of any country that has 
achieved the economic growth that China has. However, upon closer examination, 
China’s foreign policy not only displays consistencies with principles that have been 
prevalent in Chinese society since ancient times, but also appear to de-legitimise the 
hegemonic position of the United States in a number of cases. In essence, it would 
appear as if China has made the decision to bring about a transformation in 
international norms to better suit its identity, particularly in light of the diminishing 
influence of the US. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Context and background 
 
One of the most essential components in the consolidation of hegemonic power for a 
State is establishing a framework of norms and values conducive to its interests. 
Alongside garnering universal conformity, these norms must also carry connotations of 
legitimacy and moral superiority. For the remainder of this paper, such a framework of 
norms and values is referred to as a normative structure. Specifically, this paper observes 
the current normative structure designed by the United States of America (US) and how 
it is affected by the rapid ascension of an ideologically antithetical country, namely 
China.  
 
A wave of international integration over the last two centuries has forced China – a 
historically proud and isolationist civilisation – to interact with the global economy on 
relatively unfavourable terms. During the first half of the 20th Century, popular discourse 
in China revolved around revisionist strategies of staging a revolution to reform the 
international system, overthrowing the US in the process. In 1979, however, a number of 
liberal economic reforms in China were accompanied by a shift in its foreign policy 
towards a more participative position in International Relations (IR). Popular opinion 
held that China had come around to accepting the world order as it was, an assertion that 
Aftab	  Bose	  S1894986	  	   4	  
was backed by a spike in its adherence to international norms. However, closer 
examination reveals that certain core principles in China’s foreign policy have remained 
above compromise despite international pressure. In recent times, China has become 
vocal and proactive in its advocacy of these principles, irrespective of their compatibility 
within the international normative structure. Simultaneously, the normative structure 
established by the US has come under scrutiny due to a number of domestic and 
international transgressions such as failed military campaigns, the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) as well as number of alleged human rights violations .  
 
In light of these developments, the question this paper seeks to answer is: Has China 
returned to a revisionist objective with respect to the normative structure in International 
Relations? In 2004, China’s foreign policy experienced a number of changes that 
included the proclamation of a ‘peaceful rise’ to power, a vision for a new world order, a 
significant increase in aid-related activities, as well as an increasingly assertive position 
in international organisations. Through extensive analysis of these developments, this 
paper argues that China’s foreign policy has indeed undergone a reversal from the 
cooperative position it took in 1979, back to a revisionist position since 2004. Further, 
this paper employs the Constructivist notion of shifting norms, values and identities to 
highlight the two main features of China’s revisionist strategy. Firstly, the confident 
projection of a new identity as a China of the modern world, prepared to establish new 
norms and envision a new world order. Secondly, the systematic de-legitimisation of the 
normative structure established by the US, thereby creating a vacuum that can be filled 
with new principles. 
 
1.2. Research Puzzle 
 
Over the last three decades, China has surprised everyone with its monumental 
economic growth, as a result of which every aspect of China’s behaviour has come 
under intense scrutiny. Some of the questions that come to mind are: What norms and 
values constitute China’s unique identity? How has this identity manifested itself during 
China’s ascension to power in a disparate normative structure? What does the ascension 
to power of China mean for the faltering normative structure established by the US? 
This paper will attempt to answer these questions through an examination of 
contemporary Chinese foreign policy placed in historical context. The theory applied 
and the methodology used for this purpose, are described below. 
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2. Theory and Methodology 
 
2.1. Theoretical framework 
 
This paper argues from a Constructivist point of view, which operates in a paradigm that 
is separate from those of other theories such as Realism and Liberalism. As explained by 
Weins, where Realism, Liberalism and other variants of the same rest on ‘rationalist and 
materialist’ assumptions about human nature, Constructivism finds its basis in ‘irrational 
social construction’.1 In essence, Constructivists believe that all identities, interests, 
norms and values are socially constructed, which means they have the potential to 
transform, based on varying circumstances. In the international scenario, the State would 
be the primary agent to establish these identities. Moreover, the concepts that are 
socially constructed by States are subject to differing interpretations based on the shared 
understanding of individual circumstances. Renowned Constructivist scholar Alexander 
Wendt has illustrated this perfectly by stating that: 
 
500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United 
States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British 
are friends of the United States and the North Koreans are not, 
and amity or enmity is a function of shared understanding.2 
 
Constructivism was selected as the theoretical framework for this paper due to the room 
that it offers to move beyond the core assumptions about human nature that are made by 
other IR theories. The core assumptions in Realism and Liberalism (and other derivative 
theories), for example, revolve around definitions of ‘rationality’ and ‘self-interest’ that 
are arguably best suited for western societies. Discussions on Chinese philosophy that 
emerge in this paper will deal with concepts that might be classified amongst modern 
western societies as irrational. An example of such a concept would be the Confucianist 
notion of a harmonious society, where individuals are proud to serve their purpose to 
maintain social harmony and are not concerned with personal gains.3 Such a concept 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security, 20, No. 1,(Summer 
1995): 73, accessed on 26th June 2017 atmaihold.org/mediapool/113/1132142/data/Wendt-
Constructing.pdf 
2 Ibid. 
3 James Li ”Traditional Chinese World Order”, Chinese Journal of International Law 1 (2002): 29, 
accessed October 11, 2016 doi: 
http://heinonline.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/chnint1&
page=20&collection=journals 
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challenges the very basis of rationality that other IR theories assume. Given the fact that 
this paper argues for a transformation of global society to one that is tolerant of, and 
receptive to foreign norms, it is recognised that the ‘social construction’ explanation 
provided under Constructivist theory would be best suited to deal with such 
fundamentally novel concepts.  
 
As mentioned above, this paper argues that China seeks to reconstruct the norms in IR 
to better suit its own ideology and principles, not out of a desire for power but out of a 
devotion to historical principles. China has always held a worldview that differs 
fundamentally from the Westphalian world order that we exist within today. Perhaps it 
is testament to the sanctity of China’s historical principles that it has remained 
steadfastly devoted to them at every stage. As a result, China now hopes to leverage the 
substantial power that it has garnered to construct a world order in which it can maintain 
integrity with its own historical identity. In essence, this paper argues that China is 
motivated by ideological integrity, something that would not resonate with Realist or 
Liberalist explanations. 
 
2.2. Methodology 
 
This paper employs an analytical approach, specifically discourse analysis, to argue the 
case of a resurgent Chinese identity. In keeping with an analytical approach, the problem 
is broken down into its various components, each of which is subjected to an individual 
discourse analysis. In this case, the argument is that China is in the process of projecting 
its own identity and ideology in order to bring about a shift in the international   
normative structure established by the US.  
 
Firstly, a general analysis is provided on the role of identity, ideological supremacy and 
normative legitimacy in accumulating power at a hegemonic level. Secondly, this is 
applied at a practical level to understand the current ideological supremacy of the US. 
Thirdly, analysis is provided on the decline of US hegemony. Fourthly, an attempt is 
made at constituting a general Chinese identity, based on the consistencies between 
ancient Chinese philosophy and contemporary Chinese society. Lastly, discourse 
analysis of contemporary Chinese foreign policy is conducted to demonstrate the 
projection of this ideology as well as the simultaneous de-legitimisation of the values 
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espoused by the US. As mentioned above, international norms and values are assumed 
to be socially constructed and, therefore, subject to complete transformation. 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
Before engaging in analysis and argumentation, it is important to address some of the 
assumptions upon which this paper rests. For example, is the establishment of a 
normative structure really essential in consolidating hegemonic power? What is the 
nature of norms established by the US? Is the position of the US as a hegemon really on 
the decline? What is responsible for the ‘ascension of China’ to a position of power? 
What are some of the existing explanations of this ascension provided under other 
theoretical farmeworks? The following section explores these questions.  
 
3.1 Normative Structures 
 
3.1.1 The Ideological Dimension of Hegemonic Power 
 
In most cases, a hegemon is portrayed as the most powerful actor in a continuing 
scenario, one who has the power and ability to determine the behaviour of other actors 
as well as the outcomes of most incidents. Scholars such as Gramsci and Marx have 
conducted extensive analysis on hegemony, contextualised within the dynamics of class 
relations. When contextualised in the international scenario, however, the notion of 
hegemony assumes a more complex form.  
 
...the concept of hegemony may imply a great capacity for 
coercion and/or a great degree of influence or control of the 
structures of the international system and the international 
behaviour of its units, but it excludes situations where we have 
the establishment of relations of direct and official control of 
foreign governments or territories.4 
 
According to this definition, a hegemon could be any State that occupies a position to 
exert such an influence over all other countries. Naturally, the question then arises of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4Andreas Antoinades, “From ‘Theories of hegemony’ to ‘Hegemony Analysis’ in International Relations,” 
presented at  49th ISA Annual Convention, San Francisco (2008): 2  
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how such an overarching position is attained. During his analysis on Gramsci’s ‘Theory 
of Hegemony,’ Robert Bates argues that “the concept of hegemony …. means political 
leadership based on the consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion 
and popularisation of the world view of the ruling class.”5 The striking feature of this 
statement is that it places more importance on the role of ideas in hegemony than the 
more tangible influences of economic and political might. This may be attributed to the 
fact that most ascensions to hegemony have been designed around an ideological 
doctrine. In the Cold War, for example, while the US and the USSR (Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics) were engaged in a major race with respect to technology, arms and 
economic growth, the heart of the conflict lay in the ideological divide between the 
authoritarian communist regime in the USSR and the democratic capitalist philosophy of 
the US.  
 
So what exactly is the role of ideology in the consolidation of hegemonic power? As 
described by Gramsci, the dissemination of ideas held by the ruling class generates 
consent. How so? Ian Hurd attributes this power to the concept of legitimacy. According 
to Hurd, legitimacy has the power to exert an internal force on an actor in society as 
opposed to the external force exerted by coercion.. The feeling of being morally ‘right’ 
represents a powerful source of motivation that potential hegemons seek to exploit 
through the accumulation of legitimacy.6 Perhaps the most comprehensive analysis on 
relatively intangible methods of domination, however, has come from Joseph Nye 
through his concept of “Soft Power”. Nye argues that in addition to the ability to coerce 
others, hegemons also require the ability to influence the long-term attitudes and 
preferences across the world.7 This ability is accumulated through the widespread 
dissemination of a country’s language and cultural values in an attempt to make them 
universally attractive and legitimate.8 As elucidated by Kurlantzick, “Soft power stems 
from both government and non-government actors—from business people and pop stars 
and language teachers.”9 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Thomas R. Bates, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony”, Journal of the History of Ideas 36, 2 (1975): 
352, Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708933 
6 Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Relations”, International Organization, 
53,2(1999): 387  
7 Joseph S. Nye,  “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,” New York: PublicAffairs (2004): 
268. 
8Ibid. 
9 Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia,” Current History, (2006): 272 
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3.1.2 The US as a Hegemon 
 
Keeping in mind these various dimensions of hegemonic power, one could begin to 
understand the motivations that drove the struggle for moral and ideological supremacy 
during the Cold War. The struggle culminated in the emergence of a single hegemon, 
i.e., the US, and the collapse of the Soviet Union and all the values that it stood by. 
Since then, not only has the US accumulated the largest share of military and economic 
power in the world, but it has also established a normative structure that has come to be 
accepted on a global scale. Whether with respect to democratic values, liberalised 
economies or the partial surrender of sovereignty to international organisations, the US 
has attached itself to a number of values that it has propagated with the use of its 
economic and political might. As explained by Regilme and Parisot, the US propagated 
the so called ‘neo-liberal’ order, which entails large-scale privatisation and liberalisation 
of markets, primarily through institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB).10 The economic integration that resulted was further 
accompanied by  ‘cultural hegemony,’ which essentially drove other countries into 
perceiving the world in the same manner as the US.  These policies have endowed the 
US with both, legitimacy and moral high ground as well as the attractiveness to dictate 
the terms in IR. As phrased by Mark Beeson, the US currently “has a unique potential to 
shape both the rules and regulations that govern the increasingly interconnected 
international system, and the behaviour of the other state and non-state actors that 
effectively constitute it.”11 
 
Given the fact that US hegemony is constructed around a normative structure, Social 
Constructivism would suggest that this leaves room for a change in the future. 
Throughout history, a number of nations have held the title of a hegemon, ranging from 
the Roman Empire to the British Empire. Viewed from such a historical perspective, a 
hegemon would almost appear to be a necessity of some sort. Some argue that this 
necessity stems from the anarchic nature of international politics and the need for a 
single power to establish rules and punish any transgressors. In essence, the economic 
and political stability of the entire international system depends on the presence of a 
powerful actor who can dictate operations. This is known as the Hegemonic Stability 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Salvador Santino F. Regilme Jr. and James Parisot, “Debating American Hegemony: Global 
Cooperationa and Conflict. In American Hegemony and the Rise of Emerging Powers and Cooperation 
and Conflict, edited by Salvador Santino F. Regilme Jr. and James Parisot. London: Routledge (2017):1 
11 Mark Beeson ,“The Rise of the ‘Neocons’ and the Evolution of American Foreign Policy.” In: Hadiz 
VR (ed.) Empire and Neo-liberalism (2004):1 
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Theory (HST). Yazid has provided a number of examples that demonstrate the need for 
a hegemon in order to maintain stability, which include the failure of the League of 
Nations as well as the subsequent occurrence of World War II. These occurrences are 
attributed by Yazid to the failure of the US to assume the role of a hegemon after the 
First World War.12 In any case, when viewed from a Realist perspective, the race for 
security and survival amongst states would eventually produce a leader, making the 
emergence of a hegemon an inevitable entity. What then, contributes to the downfall or 
the change of a hegemon? 
 
Within her analysis on the HST mentioned above, Yazid has laid down five broad areas 
in which a hegemon must be the most powerful in order to remain in control, namely 
military, economic, political, institutional and ideological. Weakness in any one of these 
departments, with a special emphasis on the economic or political areas, could 
contribute to the downfall of hegemonic power according to Yazid. Robert Keohane 
appears to take Yazid’s emphasis on economic superiority even further when he states 
that: 
 
...to be considered hegemonic in the world political economy…a 
country must have access to crucial raw materials, control major 
sources of capital, maintain a large market for imports, and hold 
comparative advantages in goods with high value added, yielding 
relatively high wages and profits.13 
 
It is no surprise, therefore, that the position of the US as a hegemon has come under 
scrutiny in academia over the last few years, especially since the GFC of 2008. Since the 
crisis, scholars have increasingly begun to write about the decline of US hegemony. 
Regilme and Parisot, for example, have provided analysis on how the original rise of the 
neo-liberal order was deflated by a lack of economic growth in North America, thereby 
dispersing the power in IR amongst other emerging economies.14 Todd illustrates a 
manifestation of this decline in hegemonic power when he states that the US, 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Noor Mat Yazid, “ The theory of Hegemonic Stability, Hegemonic Power and International Political 
Economic Stability,” Global Journal of Political Science and Administration, 3 No. 6 (2015): 69 
13 Ibid. 
14 Regilme and Parisot, “ Debating American hegemony,” 1 
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...is battling to maintain its status as the world’s financial center 
by making a symbolic show of its military might in the heart of 
Eurasia, thereby hoping to forget and, have others ignore, 
America’s industrial weakness, its financial need, and its 
predatory character. 15 
 
The striking feature of Todd’s analysis is the fact that it directly de-legitimises the 
military campaigns of the US in the Middle-East. Aside from the decline in economic 
supremacy, the discrepancies between the official rhetoric of American military 
campaigns across the world and the actions of the US military have led to what Kagan 
has called a “crisis of legitimacy” for the US. Francis Shor, for instance, claims that the 
protracted war in Afghanistan has little to do with the location of Osama Bin Laden or 
the defeat of the Taliban, but in fact is, what he calls “punitive imperialism” as 
retribution for disagreement over a major oil pipeline that was to run across the 
country.16 Shor cites the numerous reports of bombings in hospitals and at weddings as 
testament to this assertion. Similarly, Douglas Kellner has criticised the military 
‘unilateralism’ carried out by the US in the Afghanistan war as well as the subsequent 
Iraq War, claiming that the US has acted purely out of its own best interests despite 
propagating a rhetoric of global security.17 Consequently, the US has also lost credibility 
with other powerful nations in Europe and across the world that have openly opposed 
the campaigns.18 
 
Such a dip in legitimacy amongst its peers can prove highly detrimental to the US as a 
hegemon. According to T.J. Mackeown, when a hegemon begins to impose its will on 
others–as is the case with the US– a coalition of other powerful countries begins the 
process of resisting the hegemon’s arbitrary actions. These countries rally in order to 
remove the hegemon from its position of superiority.19 In his work on reciprocal 
socialisation, Maximillian Terhalle has described the BASICS (Brazil, South Africa, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Emmanuel Todd, C. Delogu, and Geoffrey McNicoll. "After the Empire: The Breakdown of the 
American Order." Population and Development Review 31, no. 1 (2005): 178. 
16 Francis Shor. "War in the Era of Declining U.S. Global Hegemony." Journal of Critical Globalisation 
Studies 1, no. 2 (2010): 72. 
17 Douglas Kellner, "The Media and the Crisis of Democracy in the Age of Bush-2." Communication and 
Critical/Cultural Studies 1, no. 1 (2004): 32. 
18 G. John Ickenberry, “Is American Multilateralism in Decline,” Perspectives on Politics, 1, No.3 (2003): 
539  
19 T J. Mackeown, “Hegemony in International Relations”, International Relations, vol.2 (2015): 2 
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India and China) coalition, which thwarted the US agenda at the 2009 Copenhagen 
Summit, to be a coalition of this precise nature.20 
 
Therefore, it would appear that the US has faltered in each of the departments put forth 
by Yazid. Scholars such as Chomsky have been quick to declare that the era of US 
hegemony is in steady decline. On the other hand, academics such as Tamara Wittes 
claim that the US is currently more powerful than it has ever been in history.21 All that 
has changed, according to her, is “our perceptions of what the power can do”. In 
essence, she attributes the failures of the US in the Middle-East to the complexities of 
the region itself and not to any economic or military vulnerability on the part of the US. 
Similarly, Robert Kagan has argued against the notion that a single failed military 
campaign or a lone financial crisis are enough to diminish hegemonic power. 22 Kagan 
argues that the decline of a hegemon ususally takes decades, citing the example of 
British hegemony, which took over three decades to fall despite initial indications of 
decline. In a sense, these scholars raise valid points considering the fact that the failure 
of military campaigns does not diminish the relative economic or military capability of 
the US. However, as mentioned above, the ideological dimension of hegemonic power, 
i.e., the legitimacy held by the hegemon is crucial. There is no doubt about the fact that  
failed military campaigns, based on faulty rhetoric, have been damaging to the 
credibility of the US. Moreover, Kagan and Witte’s arguments rest on the belief that the 
relative power of the US remains steady, which may not be the case for very long either. 
While the US continues to be perceived as an economic and military powerhouse, other 
countries, especially China, are fast catching up. According to Forbes, China is set to 
overtake the US economy as early as 2018.23 The dispersion of economic power has 
been cited by other commentators such as Kupchan and Hadar to counter the assertions 
made by Kagan, arguing that the US tactic of “picking diplomatic fights” in order to 
bolster its defense budget has grown obselete in light of the decline in its legitimacy and 
economic power.24  
 
Robert Gilpin’s differentiation between the concepts of power and prestige is ideal to 
explain the relative decline in power of the US in IR. In his words, prestige is the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20Maximillian Terhalle, "Reciprocal Socialization: Rising Powers and the West." International Studies 
Perspectives 12, no. 4 (2011): 342. 
21 Tamara Cofman Wittes,. "American Hegemony: Myth and Reality (Article)." The Brookings Institution, 
No.4. (2007)  
22 Robert Kagan, "Not Fade Away." The New Republic 243, no. 1 (2012): 19 
23 Mike Patton, “China’s Economy Will Overtake the US by 2018,” Forbes (2016) 
24 Leon T. Hadar, “The Reality of American Power: Why Robert kagan is Wrong,” Huffpost, (2012) 
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“reputation for power, or the credibility and perceived resolve of a State, in the eyes of 
other states.”25 Additionally, prestige always “lags behind power” in the sense that it 
develops after power has accumulated and remains for an extended period of time 
afterwards. Due to an unequal rate of growth amongst countries, the relative power of a 
hegemon might decline much quicker than the prestige does. The fact that the US 
continues to be considered at the peak of its hegemony by scholars such as Kagan, 
despite the issues described above, suggests that the US currently commands residual 
prestige while its relative power has declined. The question, then, becomes one of who 
will challenge the position of the US as a hegemon. In 2001, the RAND corporation 
devised a “Framework for Analysis” to address the emergence of competitors in a 
hegemonic scenario. According to this study, a challenger is any actor who “attempts to 
change the basic rules of the international system without consulting the hegemon.” The 
framework states that upon the emergence of a challenger,  
 
The hegemon has little leeway, since failing to respond to a 
challenger that openly violates the rules amounts to an admission 
that it cannot enforce the rules, leading to a loss of relative power 
between it and the challenger. Not surprisingly, empirical studies 
show that challenges to the hegemon generally occur when the 
challenger has about as much power as the hegemon.26 
 
Based on both the rule breaking criteria as well as the power parity, this paper argues 
that the “challenger” in the contemporary international scenario is China.  
 
3.2 The Rise of China 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the economy of China is projected to overtake that 
of the US by 2018. This rapid rate of growth has raised debates amongst academics 
around the intentions of China once it hits the peak of its international power. The doubt 
about China’s intentions is accentuated by its ambiguous behaviour in the international 
scenario, which has made it challenging for academics to club its behaviour within the 
existing theories of IR. For example, certain aspects of China’s foreign policy such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): 
591. 
26 Thomas S. Szayna,, Daniel Byman, Steven C. Bankes, Derek Eaton, Seth G. Jones, Robert Mullins, Ian 
O. Lesser and William Rosenau, “The Emergence of Peer Competitors: A Framework for Analysis” 
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the bolstering of its military in the South China Sea could be viewed as highly passive-
aggressive in its approach, which defensive Realists have touted as an example for their 
explanation of events. Other aspects, such as the efforts to increase economic ties with, 
and the subsequent inter-dependence with the US appear to fall under the 
Liberalists/Liberal-institutionalist interpretations. In essence, it is still not certain how 
the international scenario will shape up with an increasingly powerful China in the 
picture. This paper provides one possible explanation for China’s recent behaviour, 
particularly since 2005. However, before providing an interpretation of Chinese foreign 
policy, it is important to examine the evolution of China’s economic growth story. 
 
3.2.1 Historical Background 
 
This section will focus on the development of China since the introduction of economic 
reforms in 1979. Following the death of Chairman Mao Tse Tung in 1979, Deng 
Xiaoping introduced a number of liberal reforms that brought about a major 
transformation in China. Prior to this, the Chinese economy was modelled around 
centralised government planning, in which agriculture was collectivised and a majority 
of industrial investments were undertaken by the government.27 However, the pitfalls of 
pivotal economic developments such as the Great Leap Forward as well as the Cultural 
Revolution caused a significant drop in the per-capita purchasing power in China. 
Deng’s reforms, which included partial privatisation of agriculture, decentralisation of 
industry to be run on free market principles, and the establishment of free economic 
zones across the country, were all targeted specifically at increasing the purchasing 
power of Chinese citizens.28 Since the reforms of 1979, the Chinese economy has grown 
at an average of 10% annually, despite the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and the 
subsequent economic slowdown after 2010.29 
 
Alongside the rapid economic development, the post-reform period has also been 
characterised by a major shift in the foreign policy of China. According to Wang, the 
debates amongst IR scholarship in post-reform China reversed their focus from the 
“overthrowing the old international order” to seeking the “most efficient methods of 
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28 Ibid., 4 
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increased international integration.”30 The new era was said to be characterised by 
“rationalism and national interest” rather than by the class sentiments that were so 
prevalent previously. Since then, despite principle disagreements with the US over a 
number of aspects of IR such as the Democratic Peace Theory or the invasion of 
Kosovo, China has continued its integration into the current international order, 
particularly since becoming a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. 
The increase in integrative efforts has been accompanied by efforts to debunk myths of a 
‘China threat’ that had entered the academic rhetoric in the West.  
Therefore, it would appear as if the economic boost experienced by China, as a result of 
Deng’s reforms, has given it the confidence to look outward and become an active 
member of the international community. Certain issues, however, have emerged as 
major points of contention between China and the US in particular and the international 
community as a whole. These issues primarily deal with territories such as the South 
China Sea, Taiwan, Tibet, etc., upon which China exerts historical claims, and for 
control of which it continues to lock heads with a number of countries. On occasion, 
where its internal cultural principles are challenged, China has taken a defensive stand 
irrespective of the unpopularity of its decision. This complex nature of China’s foreign 
policy has provided extensive material for debate amongst academics in IR. 
 
3.2.2 The Realist Explanation 
 
The Realist paradigm exists in a pessimistic world where individual actors act purely out 
of self-interest. The international scenario is, according to Realists, characterised by 
anarchy, where the primary goals of each actor are survival and security. Laurence 
Vincent provides a comprehensive analysis of Realism by dividing it into two of its key 
features. Firstly, it assumes the inherent selfishness of human beings, “which manifests 
in actions leading to the best possible outcome for the actor.”31 Secondly, Realists 
portray the nation-state as a macro-level manifestation of an individual in an anarchic 
society, naturally resulting in a “Zero-Sum Game”, where each nation-state constantly 
competes for comparative advantage.32 An important example of the Realist vision is the 
concept of a security dilemma. In essence, when two actors hold a relatively equal 	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amount of power and one of them decides to increase its power for any reason, the other 
actor is faced with the dilemma of whether such a boost of power was carried out with 
offensive intentions or defensive ones. 
 
As an extension of this outlook, Realists consider a conflict between China and the US 
inevitable. As China accumulates power, it will attempt to overthrow the US at the apex 
of IR. The primary indication of a potential conflict observed by most Realists is 
China’s increasing military expenditure. According to the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), China’s military expenditure rose by more than a hundred 
billion from 2008 and 2010.33 At this rate, The Economist estimates, that China’s 
military expenditure could overtake that of the US by 2035.34 John Mearsheimer, one of 
the most prominent commentators on Realism, has stated that “Anyone looking to 
determine China’s future intentions by observing its military is likely to conclude that 
Beijing is bent on aggression.”35  It is evident, therefore, that Realists do not buy into the 
‘peaceful rise’ rhetoric of China. Moreover, they also reject the idea that China is 
increasingly integrating into the international community through increased cooperation. 
With respect to soft-power, Realists add that China will not accept the norms that 
currently exist in the international system, but will make use of “social creativity” in 
order to formulate its own normative structure.36 In essence, Realists believe that China 
continues to be motivated by sentiments of class struggle. 
 
3.2.3 The Liberalist Explanation 
 
The Liberalists differ from the Realists in their fundamental assumptions about human 
nature. Where Realists assume that human nature is aggressive and competitive, 
Liberalists believe that human beings have an inherent desire for peace, in the pursuit of 
which they are willing to cooperate and devise mechanisms to maintain stability. An 
ideal explanation of Liberalist theory is the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT). According 
to the DPT, individuals in a democratic society are liberal by nature, and, therefore, 
desire peace and stability to exist and actualise. Therefore, unlike with violent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 “SIPRI Yearbook 2013” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,” 
www.sipri.org/yearbook/2013 
34  “The Dragon’s New teeth: A Rare Look Inside the World’s Biggest Military Expansion” The 
Economist (2012) 
35  John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” The  Chinese 
Journal of International Politics, vol. 3 (2010): 384 
36 James Reilly, "A Norm-Taker or a Norm-Maker? Chinese Aid in Southeast Asia." Journal of 
Contemporary China 21, no. 73 (2012): 72 
Aftab	  Bose	  S1894986	  	   17	  
authoritarian regimes, when interacting with another democracy, an actor can be certain 
of peaceful intentions due to a similar desire for peace amongst the citizens of the other 
country. The DPT is backed empirically by the fact that two democracies have never 
been to war with each other throughout history. 
 
Liberalists, therefore, celebrate the outward turn in Chinese foreign policy over the last 
few decades. According to them, an increase in the inter-dependence between China and 
other countries is insurance against disruption of the international order. For example, 
Hudda suggests that China’s increased contributions to institutions such as the World 
Bank or the IMF reduces the likelihood for it to actively challenge the system in which 
such institutions operate.37 Reports suggest that the US currently owes China upwards of 
US $1 trillion, which makes an attack of any sort on China by the US, equally 
unlikely.38 As Steven Pinker suggests, “though the relationship between America and 
China is far from warm, we are unlikely to declare war on them or vice-versa. Morality 
aside, they make too much of our stuff and we owe them too much money.”39 Therefore, 
it would appear that Liberalists largely buy into the Chinese rhetoric of an increasingly 
cooperative outlook in International Relations, including its proclamation of a ‘peaceful 
rise’ through increased economic interaction. 
 
3.2.4 The Constructivist Explanation 
 
It is very important to note the role played by perceptions in both the Realist and 
Liberalist paradigms. The perception of a State, based on the shared identity, constructed 
irrationally, may alter the manner in which its behaviour is interpreted in IR. Using this 
framework of understanding, a Constructivist approach would allow us to comment on 
both the Realist and the Liberalist explanations of China’s growth in stature. For 
example, Realist concerns of China’s military threat stem from two social constructs. The 
first is a scenario where the international system is characterised by a race for power and 
hegemony. The second is a mistrust of Chinese intentions due to its previous identity as 
an isolationist, revolutionary actor that is now hoping to reform the international order. 
Most importantly, Realists also comment on the ability of China to re-create international 
norms, a notion that is inherently constructivist. Similarly, Liberalists place their trust in 	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equally abstract social constructions, i.e., the ability of international organisations to 
transform the aloof Chinese identity into a cooperative one. Therefore, the entire 
Liberalist argument relies on the dynamic nature of norms and identities. 
 
The Constructivist theory exists within its own flexible paradigm that allows for radical 
change of human behaviour. It is no surprise, therefore, that Constructivist scholars are 
divided on their opinion on China’s interaction with the current normative structure. The 
common denominator remains the ability of norms to change. However, while some 
argue that China has the power to change international norms, others place their faith in 
the strength of the international normative structure to transform China’s internal norms. 
Johnston, for instance, argues that while the initial decisions of China will be shaped by 
internal principles, eventually the mimicking and interaction, based on existing norms, 
will lead to adoption of these norms.40 However, this paper argues from a Constructivist 
point of view to demonstrate that Johnston’s prediction has not been realised completely.  
 
While China has been forced to accept certain norms such as membership of 
international organisations out of sheer necessity, it has remained strongly rooted in its 
identity. This ideological integrity has manifested itself in a number of ways, which will 
be examined in detail at a later point in this paper. At any rate, It can be derived from the 
analysis above that the normative structure of the US no longer remains in a position to 
transform the identity of a country as powerful and determined as China. As a result, 
China is now in a position to take advantage of a faltering normative structure to exert an 
influence of its own on international norms. This paper seeks to provide evidence of the 
fact that China has begun to decisively exert such an influence. 
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4. Analysis and Argumentation 
 
4.1 The Chinese Identity 
 
In order to gain a comprehensive grasp of what could be perceived as China’s identity, it 
is important to understand the historical roots from which Chinese culture, society and 
politics have emerged. In their work titled, “Chinese Traditional World Order,” Li and 
Zhaojie have provided an intricate picture of the worldview in ancient China. Drawing 
from historical texts, as well as from religious philosophies such as Confucianism and 
Taoism, Li explains the ideological evolution of ancient Chinese society right from 139 
BC. The following section explains the salient features of Chinese ideology, and 
highlights the manner in which they diverge from the fundamental concepts in the 
current world order. 
 
4.1.1 Unity and Cultural Supremacy 
 
The western norms that shape the world today employ the geographical units of States as 
the foundation of a world order. Conceptualised in the Treaty of Westphalia, 
contemporary States interact with each other on an egalitarian basis, each with a unique 
identity that stems from sovereignty and the absence of a centralised international 
authority.41In contrast, ancient Chinese civilisation perceived the world as a unified 
entity, where the only divisions lay in the social realm and not in the geographical.42In 
fact, any internal divisions that emerged in Chinese society as a result of territorial 
battles between emperors were considered a reflection of weakness. Rather than the 
conventional divisive factors such as race, origin, language or religion, the only 
distinction in Chinese society existed between those who had adopted the norms and 
values of Chinese civilisation and those who hadn’t. The former were accepted as 
civilised members of society and the latter were relegated as barbarians.43 The absence 
of other distinctions is apparent from ancient China’s receptiveness to religions, ideas 
and beliefs from across the world, including the proliferation of Buddhism and 
Christianity that were both introduced from foreign civilisations. The underlying belief, 
however, was that China embodied the most evolved civilisation and anyone was 	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welcome to assimilate themselves into Chinese culture by adopting its virtuous norms 
and values.  
 
Stemming from this perception of cultural supremacy was a sense of stable security, 
which nullified the need to actively expand the empire and convert foreign people. As 
described by Li, the general attitude towards foreign civilisations was one of “Passive 
Laissez-faire,” according to which foreign civilisations could exist in their own right but 
had to adapt to Chinese civilisation if they wished to integrate.44 The belief in cultural 
supremacy suggested that most civilisations would eventually want to integrate into the 
highly evolved Chinese one.45Such a worldview directly contradicts the expansionist 
policies that have been so predominant in the West throughout history, and also explains 
why China has few stories of colonial expansion in its history. One can see, therefore, 
how the traditional horizontal divisions between nations, religions or disciplines that we 
operate within today, did not exist in the Chinese worldview. What did exist was a 
vertical division that is described in the next section. 
 
4.1.2 The Hierarchy of Tianxia 
 
As described in the previous section, there was a strong sentiment of cultural supremacy 
in ancient China, which extended to the point where the world was seen as a Universal 
State, at the apex of lay the Chinese civilisation. This Universal State was known locally 
as Tianxia, which literally translates to “All-under-Heaven.”46As described by Wang: 
 
‘All-under-Heaven’ has a triple meaning – as the land of the 
world; as all peoples in the world; and as a world institution – 
combined in the single term, indicating a theoretical project of the 
necessary and inseparable connections among these three 
elements.47 
In essence, Tianxia represents a union of sorts of the physical, psychological as well as 
the political. However, while ancient China was largely free of horizontal divisions, it 
was highly stratified vertically, with clear hierarchical boundaries established within the 
philosophy itself. As mentioned above, the world was viewed as Tianxia and China lay at 	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the top and in the centre. Tianxia was ruled by the Emperor, known as the Tianzi or the 
‘Son of Heaven’, who was supposedly endowed with what Li terms as divine “omni-
competence,” thus making him capable of disseminating virtuous principles and 
administering justice throughout society.48 In fact, the Emperor was believed to radiate 
with such divine virtue that he was the primary source of attraction for foreign 
civilisations that wished to assimilate into Tianxia. As an extension of this belief, the 
notion of questioning any decision of the Emperor or the legitimacy of his power was 
severely punishable and, therefore, did not manifest itself. 
...the state as a whole was conceived of as an extended family, 
and the importance of filial piety in the family corresponded to 
the emphasis on the duty of absolute loyalty and obedience on the 
part of subjects to the ruler.49 
This hierarchy further perpetuated throughout the rest of Tianxia, especially with respect 
to other civilisations. The rest of the world, as described by Fairbank, was divided into 
three zones of varying importance.50 The first and most important was the Sinic Zone, 
which included countries that were culturally the most similar to China such as Korea, 
Vietnam and Japan. These countries were given preferential treatment during trade. The 
second and less important zone was the Inner Asian Zone, which consisted of the people 
within China who had migrated from other regions and were not completely assimilated 
into Chinese culture. The third zone was the Outer Zone, which consisted of the 
civilisations such as those in Europe, who had not assimilated themselves into Chinese 
culture. These civilisations were viewed as barbaric and were forced to pay tribute when 
trading with China.51 Therefore, the whole world lay below China in the hierarchy of 
Tianxia. One can imagine, therefore, how any of the contemporary concepts such as 
sovereignty, democracy or egalitarianism would lack any foundation in such a clearly 
hierarchical set up. 
4.1.3 Confucianism and the Absence of Self-Interest 
 
A notion that is absent from worldview in ancient China, and one that distinguishes it 
from the western world is the concept of duality. Where the western world is divided 	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into good and bad, right and wrong, etc., the world from China’s perspective is 
characterised by monism, where each entity has a value that contributes to overall 
harmony and equilibrium.52 From this perspective, it was unthinkable to interfere with 
the natural course of events, for each action, irrespective of how negatively it might be 
perceived from a western perspective, served a larger purpose. For the same reason, the 
natural sciences were not a major field of interest in ancient China, owing to the fact that 
nature was considered sacred and lay above human understanding or manipulation.53 
Notions of ‘growth’ or ‘development,’ therefore were absent, for the only legitimate 
actions were those that contributed to social equilibrium. One of the most 
comprehensive doctrines of monistic philosophy comes from Confucianist teachings. As 
described by Li, Confucianism was not merely a religion, but an ethical and political 
philosophy. 54  In Confucianist terms, the world was seen as “being” rather than 
“becoming,” where the ultimate goal was not to maximise gains or power, but to 
maintain equilibrium and harmony.55 The maintenance of harmony, further, had to do 
with the hierarchical structure of society discussed in the previous section. In 
Confucianist terms,  
 
If a society follows the order in which subjects serve their ruler, 
son serves his father, and wife serves her husband, society will be 
in peace and harmony, otherwise, the society will be in chaos. 
This principle will perpetuate forever.56 
Therefore, the hierarchy was established in order to keep individual elements in motion 
and establish overall harmony. The striking feature of such a form of social organisation 
is the fact that individuals function not out of self-interest but out of the sense of duty 
and loyalty to the overall structure of society. It was in the best interest of each 
individual to perform his duty and maintain harmony. The absence of self-interest was 
further accentuated by the negative perception of law as a concept in ancient China. 
Individuals in China were socialised into the delicate hierarchical structure and were 
taught to maintain social harmony.57 In such a scenario, conflict between two individuals 
was considered a failure of the socialising and educative agencies in society, as conflict 	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not only disrupted equilibrium, but also usually stemmed from personal motivations.58 
Nevertheless, in the case of a conflict, it was the duty of the parties involved to 
bilaterally resolve it in accordance with general principles. The necessity of a third 
agency such as the law to solve a conflict was perceived as a major failure of Chinese 
values, not only due to the manifestation of self-interest but also due to the fact that it 
represented an external intervention in the natural course of events.  
 
 
4.2 Manifestations of Chinese Identity in IR 
 
	  
Therefore, one could argue that the fundamental principles around which Chinese 
society and ideology has been formed do not entirely fit within the normative structure 
in the contemporary international scenario. It must come as no surprise, therefore, that 
this normative disparity has manifested itself in a number of ways throughout history, 
particularly in an increasingly integrated global system.  
 
4.2.1 The Political System 
 
Perhaps the most prominent manifestation of China’s unique ideology remains its 
political organisation. The establishment of a Communist regime in China was a long 
process that began in the early 20th Century after thousands were killed in the Boxer 
Rebellion.59 The rule of warlords that was subsequently established was ridden with 
poverty, starvation and indiscriminate killing. As a result, revolutionary Marxist ideas 
began to gather momentum across the country. Marxist – Leninist ideas grew even 
stronger in popularity after China’s defeat at the Versailles Peace Conference, which 
bred a strong anti-west sentiment amongst the populace 60  culminating in the 
establishment of the Communist Party of China in 1921 under the leadership of Li Ta-
Chao and his protégé Mao Tse Tung.61 Over time, Mao gained popularity and eventually 
came to power, later staging a revolution to establish the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) in 1949.62 Essentially, in a world where there were two clear paths open to newly 
developing nations, China naturally gravitated towards the Communist form of 
organisation.  	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Upon closer examination, the salient principles of Chinese society, described in the 
previous section, reveal an overlap with the principles that dominate the Communist 
form of social organisation. For example, the relative lack of horizontal divisions 
juxtaposed with the distinct hierarchical divisions is characteristic of both forms of 
societies. In both scenarios, the ruler is considered the superior benefactor of the people 
and the wealth and goods are distributed equally amongst the people. Further, a 
Communist society relies on the loyal contribution of their members without the more 
liberal sentiments of competition, surplus or profit. Such a social etiquette bears a close 
resemblance to the Confucianist principle that places duty in a crucial position for the 
maintenance of social harmony. A comparison can further be drawn between the divine 
power attributed to the Tianzi (Son of Heaven) described above, and the omni-
competence attributed to the Chairman of the Communist Party of China, who is 
believed to be the ultimate embodiment of justice and virtue. Therefore, the adoption 
and consolidation of a Communist regime may be interpreted as one powerful 
manifestation of Chinese social values. 
 
4.2.2 Territorial Integrity 
 
As has been described in section 4.1.1, any divisions within ancient Chinese society 
were perceived as a sign of weakness. All efforts were made throughout history to 
ensure unity and strength within the Chinese kingdom. This point of view persists in 
contemporary times, which is evident from the determination with which China has 
pursued its One China Principle (OCP). The OCP involves efforts to ensure 
reunification with territories that have seceded from the original Kingdom.63 Take, for 
example, the case of Taiwan. Taiwan is a tribal island that first showed up in Chinese 
historical records in AD239, after being discovered by a group of contracted explorers 
from Beijing.64 Taiwan was first separated from China after the first Sino–Japanese war, 
when a Japanese victory forced China to concede the province. When Japan was 
defeated in the Second World War, decades later, China regained control over the island.  
 
During the revolution of 1949 when Mao’s troops defeated the Kuomintang (KMT) 
forces across the country, the KMT leader Chiang and his forces fled to Taiwan where 	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they established control over the region. Once again, China had lost the territory of 
Taiwan, setting in motion a long line of strategic attempts to regain control, some of 
which were aggressive, and others that were extraordinarily concessionary. For example, 
in 1971, the PRC successfully ousted Taiwan from the United Nations (UN), thereby 
refusing to recognise it as a separate State and convincing the international community 
to do the same. On the other hand, in the 1980s the PRC extended an olive branch in the 
form of a special arrangement. 65  The arrangement, known as ‘one country, two 
systems,’ 66  would grant Taiwan a significant amount of political and economic 
autonomy provided it agreed to unification. The special arrangement was rejected by 
Taiwan and the situation remains unresolved till date.  
 
The example of Taiwan demonstrates the extent to which China is willing to go in order 
to protect its territorial integrity. China was willing to accept a politically and 
economically detrimental situation, i.e.,‘the one country, two systems’ approach, purely 
out of the need to reclaim a territory that it once controlled. The case of Taiwan is not 
the only example of the strong devotion to a unified China. Tibet, India, as well as the 
Philippines have had to face the brunt of the China’s determination. Due to a desire for 
independence, Tibet has had a long history of violence with China, the peak of which 
came in 1959, when over 300,000 Tibetans were killed by Chinese troops in response to 
an uprising for independence.67  
 
With respect to India, the trouble arose at the Simla Convention of 1914 where Britain, 
China and Tibet met in India to construct the boundaries between India and its 
neighbouring countries.68 At the time, a province by the name of Tawang (Now 
Arunachal Pradesh, in India) situated in the South of Tibet was placed within the Indian 
Territory.69 China refused to sign the treaty and immediately exited the negotiations to 
express its dissent. Decades later, in 1962, China launched a surprise invasion on India 
with the primary objective of regaining control over the Tawang region.70 These attacks 
came despite the recently preceding diplomatic developments between the two countries 
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in which agreements were signed to foster a friendly and mutually beneficial 
relationship.  
 
Lastly, the issue between the China and the Philippines revolves around a portion of 
territory in the South China Sea over which China exerts a historical claim, despite its 
location near the coast of the Philippines. China’s claim to the territory is backed by the 
island’s location within The Nine-Dash Line, which is ostensibly a historical 
demarcation of Chinese territory in the sea that extends over an area of over 2,000 
Kilometres outside of Mainland China and covers a group of islands.71 Within this 
region, China has denied or controlled the navigation rights of other countries, including 
the Philippines, deploying substantial military force and bolstering it periodically. 
Despite the ambiguity of the origins of this line, as well as a ruling from the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration in The Hague against the occupation, China has refused to 
relinquish control over its territory.72 
 
In each of the above situations, China has put key diplomatic ties, major economic 
relationships, as well as its overall reputation in the international community on the line, 
purely in pursuit of territories that it exerts a historical claim over. While the South 
China Sea and even the island of Taiwan are economically lucrative regions to control, 
one could argue that the small provinces of Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet lack the same 
economic value. One might conclude, therefore, that the desire for control over these 
territories stems from something other than purely economic considerations. The loss of 
control over these territories represents weakness and a descent from former glory, 
something that has seldom been tolerated in Chinese society.  
 
4.2.3 Non-Interference 
 
Historically, China has rarely been associated with extensive colonial expeditions. As 
described in section 4.1.1, Chinas’s policy of expansionism relied on the attractiveness 
of its civilisation and the resultant assimilation of other civilisations. Furthermore, the 
philosophy of ‘Passive Laissez-faire’ was elaborated upon above to describe China’s 
attitude towards foreign civilisations. Perhaps the most appropriate manifestation of this 
philosophy in recent times is the concept of ‘Five-Principles of Peaceful Co-existence,’ 	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formulated by China in the 1950s during an attempt to foster friendly relations with 
other countries in Asia. These principles include: “mutual respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal 
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.”73 Since the 1950s, China 
has continued to exert these principles in most international fora that it has participated 
in. Despite the increasingly inter-connected nature of global politics and the 
corresponding spike in interventionist policies, China has repeatedly asserted the 
importance of preserving the sanctity of sovereignty. These assertions appear to run in 
tandem with the philosophy of allowing nature to take its course without external 
interference as well as the Confucianist ideal of the world as ‘being, not becoming’. To 
put this philosophy in State terms:  
 
China's alternative design for the world stresses the equal, 
uninfringeable sovereignty of all states, large and small, Western 
and non-Western, rich and poor, democratic and authoritarian, 
each to run its own system as it sees fit, whether its methods suit 
Western standards or not.74 
 
Even during international trade, China refrains from discriminating on the basis of the 
type of regime, dealing with authoritarian and democratic regimes alike in an equitable 
manner. It is clear from this summary of China’s overall foreign policy that it remains 
devoted to this principle of non-interference. However, alongside the positive assertions 
of this philosophy such as the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,’there have also 
been some more controversial manifestations. For example, China has been opposed to 
any form of partial surrender of sovereignty in order to bolster the power of international 
organisations. As a result, any decision inflicted upon them by such institutions, an 
example of which is The Hague ruling on the South China Sea described above, usually 
remains unheeded . China’s disregard for The Hague ruling is also in resonance with the 
negative perception of law in Chinese society. In keeping with the philosophy that 
conflicts must be settled bilaterally between the parties involved – portraying the law as 
a regrettable necessity for extreme situations – China has repeatedly asserted that issues 
between any two States must be settled bilaterally without intervention by international 
organisations.  	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Lastly, China often abstains from voting in the UN when issues of intervention are being 
discussed. By abstaining, China manages to remain devoted to its principles, without 
clashing with the interests of the international community. On the whole, this is the 
attitude that represents China’s foreign policy. Evidently, acting in accordance with its 
cultural principles and identity is consistently China’s utmost priority. In some situations 
such as voting in the UN, these principles can be prioritised without causing disruptions. 
In other cases where such a win-win position cannot be attained, there is no 
demonstration of a willingness to negotiate. Even after adopting an increasingly 
cooperative foreign policy over the last few decades, China has made it sufficiently clear 
that it is not willing to compromise when it comes to ideological considerations. 
 
4.3 The Peaceful Rise  
 
However, over time, the steadfast devotion to cultural values diminished in feasibility. 
As the global circumstances have demanded it, China has had to somewhat revise its 
positions accordingly. A striking example of this is the liberal nature of reforms 
introduced by Den Xiaoping in 1979. The privatisation of industry and agriculture 
represented a major compromise in China’s anti-profit philosophy. These reforms were a 
reaction to the economic stagnation and the decline in purchasing power, which can 
largely be attributed to the isolationist nature of China in an increasingly inter-connected 
global economy. A free-market economy and the invitation of foreign investment had 
become the path to development for several countries at the time, including China’s 
immediate neighbours such as Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore.75 
 
The relatively slow rate of growth in China bred restlessness amongst the people who 
were now exposed to the perks of a free market.76  Therefore, China began to adapt its 
policies to the emerging trends in the global economy. The economic reforms were not 
the only manifestation of China’s adaptive policies. As noted above, a historically 
isolationist China has become an active and integral member in the international 
community in recent decades. Having begun in 1971, when China was officially 
accepted into the UN, its involvement progressively increased until it was a part of the 
50 Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs) and 1,275 International Non-	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Governmental Organisations (INGOs) by the year 2000. 77 Not only has China chosen to 
participate, but it has done so in a highly responsible manner, taking the initiative in key 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).78 Strikingly, 
these institutions have mandates with which China may disagree with vehemently at 
times.  
 
On the other hand, China has maintained a strong grip over the market through 
regulations and has resisted the international pressure to democratise, which had become 
a major trend amongst developing countries at the time of the reforms. Moreover, China 
has maintained a cautious attitude, wherever possible, during its operations with 
international organisations, primarily due to concerns over the infringement of 
sovereignty. As elucidated by Kent,  
 
While China's leaders appreciate that membership of international 
organisations enhances China's power and status and is essential 
to participation in globalisation and modernisation, they are also 
alive to the problems posed by international citizenship.79 
 
On several occasions, China has expressed concerns that these organisations represent 
instruments of US hegemony. This assertion, combined with the cautious yet active 
involvement in the international community reveals a deeper struggle that China might 
have been grappling with. Essentially, China is caught between the necessity of 
cooperation and the danger of being caught in the normative web of US hegemony. To 
the best of its ability, China has attempted to maintain its ideological integrity, much to 
the dissatisfaction of the US at times. Kent argues that China shifted from a “'system-
reforming' approach in the 1970s, to a 'system-maintaining and system-exploiting' 
approach in the 1980s and 1990s.”80  This opinion has been validated by the fact that 
China continues to seek the benefits from international organisations on the grounds of 
being a developing country, despite having emerged as an economic powerhouse. Reilly 
describes this as a “pragmatic ‘mini–max’ approach in international institutions, seeking 
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to maximise China's benefits while minimizing costly obligations or constraints.”81 
Therefore, in addition to enjoying the economic benefits of liberalisation, China has also 
managed to attain a balance between engaging with the international community and 
preserving its identity. As a result, the 21stCentury has witnessed the phenomenal rise of 
the Chinese economy, as well as its consolidation as a stalwart of authoritarian state-
control.  
 
This paper uses a Constructivist lens to interpret the strategy of China in IR. The 
sections above have already described China’s weariness of the US hegemonic structure, 
primarily due to its ideological divergence from the Chinese identity. To the best of its 
abilities, China tried to fend off the hegemonic advances of the US throughout the 20th 
Century and succeeded to a large extent. However, the gradual decline in US hegemony 
and the increase in China’s power, allows an opportunity for China to make its position 
more comfortable. Wang asserted that the rhetoric within China had shifted in the 1980s 
from one of a revolutionary overthrow of the international system to the rhetoric of 
increased integration. This paper argues that the year 2004 marks a reversal of this 
rhetoric back to the overthrow of the international normative structure. Over the past few 
decades, China has appeared to employ a two-pronged strategy to bring about this 
transformation. Firstly, China has utilised a combination of carefully devised rhetoric 
and exertion of soft-power to project a strong identity, making sure to elucidate and 
portray the merits of its principles. Secondly, it has attempted to systematically de-
legitimise the normative structures that have been established by the US. The following 
is an elaboration on each of these strategies. 
 
4.4 Identity Projection 
 
With respect to the projection and legitimisation of a Chinese identity, the flagship 
endeavour for China has been the ‘Peaceful Rise’ rhetoric, which entails that the growth 
of China will be achieved through reciprocal interaction with the international 
community resulting in mutual benefit.. The strategy, put forth in 2004, was brought 
about to debunk the Realist assertions of a hostile China that might resort to military 
measures to topple US hegemony. A year later, China changed the name of the strategy 
from ‘Peaceful Rise’ to ‘Peaceful Development’ in order to eliminate any connotations 
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of power that accompany the word ‘rise’.82 
Substantial evidence of the projection of Chinese identity and values emerged in 2005. 
On the 60th anniversary of the UN, the Chinese President Hu Jintao proclaimed his 
vision for a new world order that could be achieved through a number of measures:83 
Firstly, the introduction of a ‘New Security Concept,’ based on “mutual trust, mutual 
benefit, equality, and collaboration and the establishment of a fair and effective 
collective security mechanism.” Secondly, an attempt to make the 21st Century an era of 
inclusive development, primarily through efforts to realise the Millennium Development 
Goals of the UN, which are designed to eradicate major issues in poorer countries. 
Thirdly, to have the utmost respect for a country’s individual ‘social system’ and path to 
development based on its unique ‘national conditions’.” Each of these principles 
correlates strongly with the principles that constitute the Chinese identity. The striking 
aspect of this proclamation was that these principles were no longer expressed under the 
garb of dissent, but were openly declared as new principles, irrespective of their inherent 
contradictions with the existing normative structure. This would demonstrate a historic 
shift, from the passive position that China has always held to a more confident stance. 
This confidence has since been reflected in other areas of China’s foreign policy. An 
example of this is the BASICS coalition that was formed prior to the Copenhagen 
Summit in 2009. As described by Maximillian Terhalle, each of the countries in this 
coalition possessed and advocated hard notions of sovereignty, which placed them in 
opposition to the partial delegation of sovereignty to an international institution.84 These 
countries felt that it was their right to protect their path to economic development from 
the inequitable climate regulations imposed by developed countries. Aware of the fact 
that the developed countries would present a draft with the agenda for the Summit, the 
BASICS coalition presented its own counter-agenda, threatening to disrupt the 
Convention if their demands were not met.85 The relevance of this example is that the 
coalition was formed at the initiative of, and rallied by, China. In fact, the meeting, at 
which the counter-agenda was drafted, was held in Beijing.  
This represented the first time that China had expressed its dissatisfaction through more 
than just an abstention, regarding something other than territorial intervention. This 
issue represented the protection of another core Chinese principle, i.e., the sanctity of 	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sovereignty and the principle of non-interference. According to Terhalle, this initiative 
marked a turning point in IR as it was the first time that the ‘Western’ agenda was 
opposed in such a pro-active manner. This is not the only example, since 2005, of China 
openly opposing the agenda of an international organisation. In the 2009 periodic review 
of China conducted by the United Nations Human Rights Council, China denied the 
allegations of human rights violations placed by the Council and refused to support the 
recommendations of the member states, calling them ‘politicised’.86 Therefore, not only 
has China demonstrated the confidence to proclaim its agenda for a new world order, it 
has also begun to actively propagate its principles and oppose the western agenda in 
international organisations. Terhalle has provided an adept explanation of these events, 
describing them as part of a process of “Reciprocal Socialisation.” In essence, rather 
than socialising themselves into the normative structure put forth by the US, China has 
reciprocated the process by changing the very nature of the norms. 
Aside from confidently projecting its identity, China has also bolstered its efforts to 
garner support amongst the international community by building its soft-power, labeled 
by Kurlantzick as China’s “Charm Offensive.”87 Despite a conflictual relationship with a 
number of South-East Asian countries, China has made concerted efforts in recent times 
to win back the support of these countries, increasingly to great success. According to 
Kurlantzick, “This growing attractiveness is conveyed through various means, including 
culture, diplomacy, participation in multi-national organisations, businesses’ actions 
abroad, and the gravitational pull of China’s economic strength.”88  
 
The primary attraction, however, is the exponential increase in the amount of aid that 
China has been distributing within the region. This surge in aid is not only limited to the 
region of South-East Asia. In 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited four developing 
countries, namely Cuba, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina and signed 39 different 
cooperation agreements.89 The same year marked the first celebration of the South-South 
Co-operation Day, following which China’s support to developing countries has grown 
by 12% annually.90 On the African continent, China is currently funding approximately 
2,650 development projects in nearly 51 countries, amounting to nearly US $100 
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billion.91 These projects were also established between 2004 and 2005.92 Regarding the 
Aid provided by China to Africa, SouthEast Asia and Latin America, a study conducted 
by the Wagner School in New York University reported that “… Chinese aid activities 
to the three regions grew from $1.5 billion in 2003 to $27.5 billion in 2006 and $25 
billion in 2007.”93 
 
The period since 2004, therefore, has been characterised by the exertion of soft-power 
coupled with strong projections of Chinese identity, both of which have begun to pay 
dividends. China’s reputation is fast gaining popularity across the world, and its 
principles are gaining mass appeal. In Africa, China has not only engaged in major 
development projects worth billions, but has also forged media relationships in order to 
improve its public perception. The media in both regions have increased coverage of 
each other, thereby, fostering familiarity between the cultures. A study conducted by the 
Washington Post in a number of African countries concluded that 63% of the people in 
these countries believed that China had a positive political and economic influence in 
the region.94 This represents a reversal of the historically negative perception of China in 
the region, stemming from its isolationist and inequitable policies.  
 
Alongside a positive shift in perceptions, China has also begun to have a political impact 
in the regions where it has nurtured relations. According to Reilly, there are only four 
African countries that currently recognise Taiwan as a country.95 Moreover, Rowan 
Callick states that “from Vietnam to Syria, from Burma to Venezuela, and all across 
Africa, leaders of developing countries are admiring and emulating what might be called 
the China Model.”96 The ‘model’, alluded to by Callick, refers to the combination of a 
free-market economy and an authoritarian political regime that China has fostered since 
1979. This model has gained popularity in some sections of the academic world, with 
some scholars stating that it combines the merits of liberalisations Foreign Direct 
Investment with the security of maintaining strict government control over the army, the 
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media and the justice system.97 Other principles such as the resistance to surrendering 
partial sovereignty have also gained traction amongst a number of developing countries 
that have rallied behind China to oppose the agenda set by developed countries. 
 
4.5 From the Other Perspective 
 
Analysis was provided earlier on the importance of a normative structure in the 
establishment of hegemonic power. Similar to the core values upon which China has 
based its identity, the US has risen to prominence based on certain core values that it has 
espoused, propagated and defended at every turn. This section will examine some of 
those core values, their manifestations, and the manner in which China has (intentionally 
or not) undermined them with its behaviour in International Relations. 
 
4.5.1 Economic Liberalisation 
 
Perhaps the most prominent aspect of US hegemony in IR is the Bretton Woods (BW) 
System. The System is named after the place where the United Nations Monetary and 
Financial Conference took place in 1944, at which the foundations of the BW System 
were laid down. Three major developments took place at the BW conference that 
represent the three major pillars of the economic hegemony that the US holds today. 
These are: the establishment of the IMF, the establishment of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the agreement for the 
establishment of fixed exchange rates at the centre of which lay the US currency, i.e., 
the dollar. 98 The following is an assessment of how these pillars contribute to US 
hegemony and how China has attacked them individually. 
 
Firstly, the IMF and World Bank were established as mechanisms to promote and 
facilitate international trade for the “maintenance of high levels of employment and real 
income.”99 The primary method of achieving these goals is by minimising the domestic 
restrictions on international trade to the greatest possible extent. In the latter half of the 
19th Century, many countries were emerging from the economically crippling era of 
colonialism and, therefore, required assistance to re-establish economic stability. The 	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BW Institutions (IMF and WB) provide loans to these countries at exceedingly relaxed 
terms such as allowing a period of up to 50 years to return the loan.100 However, the 
lending is not void of conditions. According to research conducted by Eurodad, these 
agencies lend to some of the poorest countries in the world, and attach an average of 67 
conditions to each of their loans.101 These conditions primarily include guidelines for 
economic liberalisation such as the removal of trade tariffs and import duties, as well as 
the demand for privatisation of essential services within these countries. 
 
The US holds an effective right of veto over key IMF and World Bank decisions. 
Essentially, the liberalisation of these economies allows Multinational Corporations 
from the US to flood these economies with investment and subsequently, seize control 
over a large portion of their natural resources. In this manner, a large number of 
developing countries were drawn into an economic framework that was conducive to US 
interests. These institutions are a fitting representation of the liberal economic values 
that the US espouses, i.e., free-markets and liberalised economies.  
 
This system worked to reinforce the hegemonic structure as long as the BW Institutions 
were the only source of borrowing for developing countries. However, there has recently 
been a spike in aid efforts from other actors, which include the European Union (EU) 
and China.102 What differentiates Chinese aid from the aid provided by the EU, as well 
as the BW Institutions, is the fact that it is provided without any attached conditionality. 
Part of the approval that China is receiving from recipient countries, stems from the fact 
that China provides this aid in direct terms in the form of investment of which it reaps 
the economic benefits without changing the economic policies of the country involved. 
As phrased by Kurlantzick, “foreign nations benefit because China will not make 
demands on other nations’ sovereignty, economic models, governance, or political 
culture.”103 This model of aid has been described by Beijing as a ‘win-win’ model of 
aid, which it has directly juxtaposed with the aid provided by international agencies that 
infringes on sovereignty.104  
 
The aid provided by China is primarily through bilateral arrangements. Furthermore, 
China has shown itself willing to “sign these agreements en masse, leaving details to be 	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hammered out later.”105 This approach has provided dividends as well, with the Chinese 
lending in Africa now surpassing three times the total aid provided by the Organisation 
for the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which is a group of bilateral 
donor countries that includes the US.106 In essence, the model of aid in China represents 
an attractive alternative for countries in need, thereby, diminishing the previously 
powerful influence of the Bretton Woods Institutions, which no longer have a monopoly 
over the aid market. As phrased by Su, 
 
As Chinese influence grows, Beijing is presenting itself as an 
alternative to the imperialist West and interventionist United 
States: a great power exporting highways instead of values, and 
fostering stability and peace through economic development, 
infrastructure, and trade.107 
 
The values of economic liberalisation that were espoused by the BW Institutions, once 
perceived as superior, have now become a burden on weak economies. The new popular 
rhetoric for aid, even amongst European countries such as Britain and Norway, is to 
provide aid without tying it to conditions, thereby, allowing countries to develop their 
own economic and political policies. This highlights the normative impact of China even 
amongst developed countries. Lastly, China has also been involved in efforts to diminish 
the supremacy of the dollar. Recent reports suggest that China has formed an economic 
alliance with Russia in order to attempt bypassing the dollar in the international 
monetary system,108which would effectively displace the US from its position as the 
centre of the world economy. 
 
4.5.2 Democracy 
 
One of the most prominent norms that the US has vehemently attached to its identity is 
that of democracy. In the words of Mark Beeson, 
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National identity and foreign policy exist in a mutually 
constitutive, dialectical relationship in which – in American, at 
least - the discursive privileging of democracy occupies a central 
place, something which helps to account for the powerful 
continuities in American foreign policy from the Truman policy 
of containment to the Bush doctrine of pre-emption.109 
 
In essence, Beeson describes how the value of democracy has acted as both, a source of 
national cohesion within the US, as well as a solid justification for its foreign policy. The 
determination to “make the world a better place by defending the liberal ideals of 
democracy,”110 and the attachment of the concept of human rights with democratic 
values has been the rhetoric propagated by the US since its ascension to hegemonic 
power.111 These domestic values of the US have come to be perceived as superior, a 
perception that has been extensively exploited by the US in its foreign policy in both, an 
active as well as a passive manner. In an active sense, the US has used the perceived 
superiority of democratic values to justify a number of invasions such as those in 
Vietnam, Iraq, Libya and others. The passive method of democracy promotion, on the 
other hand, has come in the form of isolationism. In order to incentivise democratisation, 
the US has restricted the amount of aid and bilateral trade agreements with non-
democratic regimes, especially economically backward countries that require it the most. 
In a global economy dominated by the US, such isolation can prove catastrophic for poor 
countries. 
 
This passive strategy has come under attack from the Chinese model of developmental 
aid. As described above, China does not attach criteria or conditions to its provision of 
aid. As a result, a number of bilateral trade agreements that China has signed have been 
with authoritarian and non-democratic regimes. Alongside a number of non-democratic 
countries, China has also formed bilateral agreements with sanctioned regimes that the 
US has previously declared as ‘rogue states’ such as Iran, Syria and Sudan. 112 
Furthermore, China has also openly accused the US of double standards, referencing its 
funding of notoriously authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia, as well as b y 
pointing out the number of human rights violations that the US itself has been accused of. 	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In addition to funding sanctioned regimes in general, Kurlantzick has pointed out 
situations when China has been funding specifically those States with whom US 
diplomatic relations are under pressure, an example of which is the Philippines. In 2004, 
the Philippines withdrew its troops from Iraq in order to secure the release of a hostage, 
which led the US to sever diplomatic ties with Manila. China, subsequently, invited 
President Macapagal-Arroyo for a state visit and immediately offered agreements for 
cooperation and aid.113 
 
The aid provided by China presents an exit policy to sanctioned regimes that can now 
bypass the US to integrate with the world economy. This has arrested, to some extent, the 
wave of democratisation that was enforced by the passive policies of the US. China has 
even gone beyond creating a bypass to democratisation by portraying the benefits of its 
political system to the countries that it provides aid to. According to Kurlantzick: 
 
China emphasizes top-down control of development and poverty 
reduction and the sidelining of political reform for economic 
reform. China’s model, particularly appeals to rulers in 
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian nations. With the Chinese 
model, the regime has time to think of ways to co-opt 
businesspeople and other elites that it needs to keep on its side to 
remain in power.114 
 
While maintaining its ideological integrity by pursuing non-interference, China has 
simultaneously managed to dismantle the US values of democracy as well as projected 
and garnered attraction towards its own political system and identity. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In response to the questions this paper set out to answer, China would appear to have a 
strong identity, rooted in culture and history, which it has thus far protected and is now 
projecting to exploit the faltering normative structure of the US. However, it is 
challenging to determine the true intentions of an actor in IR. A number of 
interpretations could exist of the evidence provided, of which this paper presents only 
one. Some would argue that the behaviour of China is purely economic in nature, with 
no ideological connotations whatsoever. From this point of view, the attempt to alter the 
normative framework is just another hegemonic attempt to consolidate economic 
interests. However, the Chinese identity is a powerful one. It has evolved over centuries, 
outside the realm of any particular religion or philosophy, formed on the historical 
evolution of a civilisation that has believed itself to be supreme. One of the key features 
of the philosophy described in this paper is that people in ancient China considered 
themselves to be the centre of the entire universe and the epitome of civilisation. These 
are not notions that can be dispelled easily. Moreover, the philosophy harboured in 
China rejects the rationalist nature of Western rhetoric entirely, believing in the sanctity 
of the natural world. In that sense, it would be impossible to deconstruct a philosophy 
using concepts that are entirely formed in the West, primarily because of their radically 
different nature at a fundamental level. Therefore, it is possible to assume that society in 
China continues to function around the philosophy that it has subscribed to for 
thousands of years, primarily because it would see no reason to believe otherwise.  
 
At any rate, the dynamics of hegemony suggest that the vacuum left by the US will 
inevitably be filled by another major power. Currently, the administration in the US has 
dealt a major blow to its legitimacy in IR. Simultaneously, China continues to assert 
itself in IR under Xi Jinping. Alongside declaring China as a ‘Great Power,’ Jinping has 
also caught the attention of the international community with his ‘One Belt- One Road’ 
(OBOR) initiative.115 The OBOR project includes plans for a single economic belt 
linking China with central Asia, the Middle East and all of Europe, as well as a maritime 
route linking it with with South and SouthEast Asia. Alongside the significant boost that 
such an initiative would give to China’s soft power, it would also strategically diminish 
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the economic inter-dependence between Europe and the US.116 However, it remains too 
early to comment on the outcomes of recent initiatives such as the OBOR. On the other 
hand, such initiatives indicate that, irrespective of its intentions, China appears to be in 
the best position to fill the power vacuum left by the US in the years to come.  
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